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Abstract 
Immigrants or their children founded over 40% of the Fortune 500 US companies. This suggests that 
‘ability drain’ is economically significant. While brain drain associated with migration also induces a 
brain gain, this cannot occur with ability drain. This paper examines migration’s impact on ability, 
education, and productive human capital or ‘skill’ (which includes both ability and education) for 
source country residents and migrants, under three different regimes: (i) a points system that accounts 
for educational attainment; (ii) a ‘vetting’ system that accounts for both ability and education or skill 
(e.g., the US H1-B visa program); and (iii) a points system that combines the points and vetting 
systems (as in Canada since 2015). It finds that migration reduces (raises) source country residents’ 
(migrants’) average ability and has an ambiguous (positive) impact on their average education and 
skill, with a net skill drain more likely than a net brain drain. These effects increase the more unequal 
is ability, i.e., the higher the variance in ability. The average ability drain for highly educated US 
immigrants from 42 developing source countries is 84 percent of the brain drain, a ratio that increases 
with source countries’ income and is greater than one for most Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. Heterogeneity in ability is the ultimate cause of both ability and brain drain (as they are 
equal to zero under homogeneous ability). Policy implications are provided.  
Keywords 
Migration, points system, vetting system, ability drain, brain drain. 
JEL Code: F22, J24, J61, O15 
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1. Introduction* 
A large number of theoretical and empirical studies have examined the international migration of 
educated labor or brain drain, its determinants, its impact on human capital in migrants’ source and 
host countries, growth (Mountford 1997; Beine et al. 2001, 2008) and institutions (Docquier et al., 
2011), as well as brain gain (e.g., Mountford 1997; Vidal 1998; Beine et al. 2004, 2008; Schiff 2006; 
Docquier et al. 2011) and brain waste (e.g., Ozden 2006, Mattoo et al. 2008). Surveys of brain drain 
issues include Commander et al. (2004) and Docquier and Rapoport (2012).  
Migrants possess additional characteristics that may affect their migration and education decisions, 
an important one of which is their innate ability. The latter includes the ability to learn, communicate, 
cooperate, take risks, adapt, motivate people, work in groups, as well as attributes such as ambition, 
creative\\oty, intelligence, responsibility, leadership, work ethic, consideration of others’ viewpoints, 
and more. With developed countries’ higher return to ability, migrants tend to be positively selected 
for ability (Schiff 2006).  
Given the difficulty in measuring ability, its economic significance has not been ascertained to 
date, though the fact that over 40 percent of the US Fortune 500 companies were founded either by 
immigrants or their children (Partnership for a New American Economy, 2011) suggests the “ability 
drain” may be important. One factor that may raise its impact relative to that of the brain drain is that 
the latter generates a brain gain while an ability drain does not. In fact, one of the model’s results is 
that the ability drain is larger than or equal to the brain drain, while a comparison based on existing 
analysis for 42 developing source countries suggests that it is equal to 84 percent of the brain drain, 
with greater brain and ability drains under the vetting than under the points system.
 1
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Despite the fact that the ability drain and its impact may be important, I have only found three 
studies that use a direct measure of ability to examine its relationship with migration. Miguel and 
Hamory (2009) find a higher rural-urban migration rate in Kenya for individuals with higher cognitive 
skills, i.e., those scoring higher on a primary school test.
3
 Kleven et al. (2010) show that the migration 
response to changes in host countries’ tax rates is greater for more successful football players in 
Europe. And Akgüҫ et al. (2015) find that risk taking and (positive) attitude towards it is substantially 
greater for Chinese rural-urban migrants than for non-migrants. The fact that more able individuals are 
more likely to migrate is incorporated in the model in Section 2.  
Another study by Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett (CMP, 2009) provides estimates of the 
impact of ability on migrants’ income (more on that in Section 6). Additional studies that do not use a 
direct measure of ability but infer some aspect of its relationship with migration are Özden (2006), 
Mattoo et al. (2008), and Piracha et al. (2015). The first two studies examine the success of highly 
educated migrants in the US in terms of the degree to which there is an education-occupation match or 
mismatch (with migrants overeducated for the job they hold). They find, among others, that migration 
distance has a positive impact on their degree of success. Given that the cost of the migration project 
                                                     
*
 Thanks are due to François Bourguignon and Hillel Rapport for comments on early versions of the paper. 
1
 The points system – e.g., Canada’s pre-2015 immigration policy – accounts for prospective migrants’ education (and 
other attributes, such as age, fluency in English or French, etc.), while the vetting system – e.g., the US H1-B visa 
program (when properly run; see Section 7) – also accounts for their ability. New points systems – e.g., in Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada – consist of a combination of the two systems.  
2
 This paper deals with permanent economic migration, i.e., it does not examine return migration or issues related to 
refugees and asylum seekers. 
3
 Hanushek and Woessmann (2008, 2009) find that cognitive skills strongly impact individual income, its distribution and 
economic growth, while Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) and Heckman and Kautz (2012) provide analyses of cognitive 
and non-cognitive skills. None of these studies deal with migration.  
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rises with the distance between the US and migrants’ home country, the expected return on that project 
must increase with distance to make migration worthwhile, i.e., migrants’ ability must increase with 
distance.  
Piracha et al. (2012) similarly look at migrants’ education-occupation mismatch but they also 
include the mismatch that prevailed in the migrant’s country of origin. They find a strong relationship 
between worker-job mismatch in migrants’ country of origin and in Australia, concluding that the 
information associated with the mismatch in the country of origin constitutes an “ability signal” for 
potential employers in Australia.  
Given the potential importance of the relationship between migration and ability, the paucity of 
studies on this issue is unfortunate. Moreover, except for CMP, which focuses on migrants with nine 
years of education, none of the studies examined the ability drain or its impact. This study contributes 
to this fledgling literature by providing a migration model that enables the analysis of its impact on 
individual ability and education in the source country, on the country’s ability drain, brain drain and 
brain gain and on migrants’ (or the host country’s) ability and brain gain, as well as by obtaining 
estimates of the relative size of 𝐴𝐷 and 𝐵𝐷 for migrants with college education or higher.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the closed economy case. 
Sections 3 and 4 examine the points and vetting systems, respectively, and compare them to each other 
and to the closed economy. Section 5 briefly looks at the new points system, while Section 6 provides 
a comparison of the size of the ability and brain drains. Section 7 presents policy implications and 
Section 9 concludes. 
2. Model 
 
Assume a source and a destination or host country, where productivity of source country individual 𝑖 
depends on productive human capital or ‘skill’ 𝑠𝑖 ,4 which is assumed to be a function of innate ability, 
𝑎𝑖, and education, ℎ𝑖, with average values 𝑆, 𝐴 and 𝐻, respectively, and variance 𝑉(𝑠𝑖), 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) and 
𝑉(ℎ𝑖). Units of education are chosen such that ℎ𝑖 𝜖 [0, 1], where ℎ𝑖 = 1 represents 20 years of 
education.  
Assume that individuals’ productive human capital or skill can be observed and valued properly by 
employers in both countries. This makes sense as employers obtain the benefit of good hiring 
decisions and bear the burden of bad ones, and are therefore likely to thoroughly vet prospective 
employees in order to assess their skill level. 
 
Denote the country of origin (destination) by “0” (“d”), source country residents’ (migrants’) 
income by 𝑦0𝑖 (𝑦d𝑖), and the migration probability by 𝑝𝑖  𝜖 [0, 1]. Skill, income in both countries, and 
expected income 𝑦𝑖, are:  
 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖, 𝑦0𝑖 = 𝛼0𝑠𝑖,  𝑦d𝑖 = 𝛼d𝑠𝑖, 𝛼0 𝜖 (0, 𝛼d),  
 
𝑦𝑖 = (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑦0𝑖  +  𝑝𝑖𝑦d𝑖 = 𝑦0𝑖 + (𝑦d𝑖 − 𝑦0𝑖)𝑝𝑖 =  [𝛼0 + (𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)𝑝𝑖]𝑠𝑖 .  (1) 
 
Individuals are risk-neutral, i.e., utility, 𝑢𝑖, is a linear function of (expected) consumption, 𝑐𝑖. Assume 
for simplicity that 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖. Note, however, that the analysis applies to any utility function 𝑣𝑖 that 
increases monotonically with 𝑐𝑖, as the same value of ℎ𝑖 maximizes both 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖. In other words, the 
                                                     
4
 Note that the terms “skill” and “skilled” in the labor economics and migration literature typically refers to education and 
excludes ability, while the definition used in this paper includes both. 
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results hold for any 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣(𝑐𝑖),
𝜕𝑣𝑖
𝜕𝑐𝑖
> 0,
𝜕2𝑣𝑖
𝜕𝑐𝑖
2 < 0, ∀ 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 0, e.g., 𝑣𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛾𝑐𝑖
𝜓
; 𝛾, 𝜓 > 0, 𝜓 ≤
1, 𝛽1 ≥ 0 and 𝑣𝑖 = 𝛽2 + log(𝑐𝑖) ,  𝛽2 ≥ 0. 
The cost of education ℎ𝑖 is ℎ𝑖
2/2. Thus, (expected) consumption 𝑐𝑖  ≥ 0 is given by:  
 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 −
ℎ𝑖
2
2
= [𝛼0 + (𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)𝑝𝑖]𝑠𝑖 −
ℎ𝑖
2
2
 ≥ 0. 5    (2) 
 
Individuals maximize expected utility, subject to their innate ability and the host country’s 
immigration policy, by selecting ℎ𝑖 at the start of the period under uncertainty about the subsequent 
realization of 𝑝𝑖. For comparison purposes, the migration rate 𝑃 (or number of migrants) is identical 
under the three policies examined, i.e., 𝑃𝑝 = 𝑃𝑣 = 𝑃𝑐 = 𝑃, where 𝑃 = ∫ 𝑝𝑖𝑓(𝑎𝑖)𝑑𝑎𝑖
1
0
, with 𝑝(𝑣)(𝑐) 
denoting the points (vetting) (new vetting) system, and 𝑓(𝑎𝑖) denoting 𝑎𝑖’s probability density 
function. Pre-migration or gross average ability 𝐴𝐺 = ∫ 𝑎𝑖𝑓(𝑎𝑖)𝑑𝑎𝑖
1
0
 is the source country’s average 
ability before migration takes place. The migration probability rises with an individual’s education 
under the points system, and with both education and ability – or skill – under the vetting system.6 
Interior solutions are assumed.  
Importantly, note that the analysis provided in this paper is also relevant for any function 𝑣𝑖 that is 
monotonically increasing in 𝑐𝑖, as the same value of ℎ𝑖 maximizes both 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖. In other words, the 
results hold for any vi = v(ci),
∂vi
∂ci
> 0, ∀ ci ≥ 0. For instance, vi = γci
ψ
; γ, ψ > 0, ψ ≷ 1. A utility 
function could be represented by any function 𝑣𝑖 where 
𝜕2𝑣𝑖
𝜕𝑐𝑖
2 < 0, e.g., 𝑣𝑖 = log (𝑐𝑖) or 𝑣𝑖 = 𝛾𝑐𝑖
𝜓
, 
𝜓 < 1.  
2.1. Closed Economy 
 
Before turning to the points and vetting systems, results are provided for the ‘closed economy’ 
immigration policy. In that case, the migration probability 𝑝𝑖 = 0. Denoting the variables in this case 
with subscript “0”, equation (2) becomes:  
 
𝑐𝑖0 = 𝑦𝑖0 −
ℎ𝑖0
2
2
= 𝛼0𝑠𝑖0 −
ℎ𝑖0
2
2
=  𝛼0(𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖0) −
ℎ𝑖0
2
2
≥ 0.     (3) 
Maximizing 𝑐𝑖0 with respect to ℎ𝑖0, the values for ℎ𝑖0, its average 𝐻0, average ability 𝐴0, skill 𝑠𝑖0, 
average skill 𝑆0 and its variance 𝑉(𝑠𝑖0), consumption 𝑐𝑖0 and its average 𝐶0, are: 
 
ℎ𝑖0 = 𝐻0 = 𝛼0, 𝐴0 = 𝐴
𝐺, 𝑠𝑖0 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛼0, 𝑉(𝑠𝑖0) = 𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆0 = 𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0,  
 
𝑐𝑖0 = 𝛼0 (
𝛼0
2
+ 𝑎𝑖), 𝐶0 = 𝛼0 (
𝛼0
2
+ 𝐴𝐺).       (4) 
                                                     
5
 Income is linear in ℎ𝑖, while education cost is quadratic in ℎ𝑖. Thus, investment in education exhibits diminishing returns, 
which is consistent with empirical findings.  
6
 Thus, average education and skill levels are higher for migrants than for residents, i.e., migrants are positively selected 
for both ability 𝑎𝑖  and education ℎ𝑖. As Docquier and Marfouk (2006) show for education, the share of the highly 
educated in South-North migrants is three times that among the South’s residents, and larger for poor, landlocked and 
island countries (e.g., the ratio is fifteen for Sub-Saharan Africa and larger for the Caribbean).  
Maurice Schiff 
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3. Points System 
Under the points system (e.g., Canada’s pre-2015 policy), applicants receive points for education but 
not for ability. The immigration probability 𝑝𝑖𝑝 is 𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑝, to which a constant, 𝜋𝐴
𝐺 , is added to ensure 
the average immigration probability or average migration rate is identical under the points and vetting 
systems, i.e., 𝑃𝑝 = 𝑃𝑣 = 𝑃, which is assumed for comparison purposes (as shown later).  
The immigration probability and consumption in this case are:  
 
𝑝𝑖𝑝 = 𝜋(𝐴
𝐺 + ℎ𝑖𝑝), 𝑐𝑖𝑝 = [𝛼0 + 𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)(𝐴
𝐺 + ℎ𝑖𝑝)](𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑝) −
ℎ𝑖𝑝
2
2
≥ 0, 𝜋 > 0. (5) 
Defining 𝜙 ≡ 1 − 2𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0) and 𝜆 ≡ 
𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)
𝜙
, solutions for ℎ𝑖𝑝, 𝐻
𝐺, 𝑠𝑖𝑝, 𝑆𝑝
𝐺, 𝑝𝑖𝑝 and 𝑃𝑝 are given 
by:  
 
ℎ𝑖𝑝 =
𝛼0 
𝜙
+ 𝜆(𝑎𝑖 + 𝐴
𝐺), 𝐻𝐺 =
𝛼0
𝜙
+ 2𝜆𝐴𝐺 , 𝑠𝑖𝑝 =
𝛼0 + 𝑎𝑖 
𝜙
− 𝜆(𝑎𝑖 − 𝐴
𝐺),  
 
𝑆𝑝
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑣
𝐺 = 𝑆𝐺 = 𝐴𝐺 + 𝐻𝐺 =
1
𝜙
(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺),  
 
𝑝𝑖𝑝 = 𝜋 [
𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺
𝜙
+ 𝜆(𝑎𝑖 − 𝐴
𝐺)] , 𝑃𝑝 =
𝜋
𝜙
(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) = 𝑃,     (6) 
where 𝜙 > 0 is the second-order condition and 𝐻𝐺 denotes the average ‘gross’ education level, i.e., 
the education level that includes the brain gain generated by the points system but before migration 
takes place, i.e., excluding the brain drain.
7
  
Note also that 𝑃𝑣 = 𝑃𝑝 = 𝑃 implies 𝐻𝑣
𝐺 = 𝐻𝑝
𝐺 = 𝐻𝐺 (as can be seen by comparing equation (6) 
with equation (11) in Section 4) and 𝑆𝑣
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑝
𝐺 = 𝑆𝐺 = 𝐴𝐺 + 𝐻𝐺. And the brain gain (i.e., excluding 
the brain drain) is: 𝐻𝑝
𝐺 − 𝐻0 = 2𝜆(𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0).  
Since 
1
𝜙
=
𝜙 + 2𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)
𝜙
= 1 + 2𝜆, we have 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑝) = 𝑉 [
𝛼0 + 𝑎𝑖 
𝜙
+ 𝜆(𝐴𝐺 − 𝑎𝑖)] = 𝑉 [(
 1 
𝜙
−
𝜆) 𝑎𝑖] = 𝑉[(1 + 𝜆)𝑎𝑖] = (1 + 𝜆)
2𝑉(𝑎𝑖) = (1 + 𝜆)
2𝑉(𝑠𝑖0) > 𝑉(𝑠𝑖0). Thus, the points system raises 
the variance of individual skills or skill inequality, relative to the closed economy case. The greater 
skill inequality can also be seen from the derivatives 
𝜕𝑠𝑖0
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= 1 and 
𝜕𝑠𝑖𝑝
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= 1 + 𝜆.  
The host country’s policy change from a closed economy to a points system raises the expected 
return on education, with an impact on residents’ education and skill ℎ𝑖𝑝 − ℎ𝑖0 = 𝑠𝑖𝑝 − 𝑠𝑖0 =
𝜆(𝑎𝑖 + 𝐴
𝐺 + 2𝛼0) > 0. However, residents’ average skill need not increase because education 
increases with ability, which raises the migration probability. Thus, the migration rate is higher 
(lower) at higher (lower) ability and education levels, which reduces both average ability and average 
education.  
Denote a variable 𝑥𝑖𝑝’s average value by 𝑋𝑝 ≡
1
1−𝑃
∫ 𝑥𝑖𝑝(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑝)𝑓(𝑎𝑖)𝑑𝑎𝑖
1
0
 for source-country 
residents, by 𝑋𝑝
𝑀 ≡ 
1
𝑃
∫ 𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑓(𝑎𝑖)𝑑𝑎𝑖
1
0
 for migrants, by 𝑋𝑝𝑁 ≡ (1 − 𝑃)𝑋𝑝 + 𝑃𝑋𝑝
𝑀 for all natives, 
and by 𝑆𝑝
𝐺  (𝑆𝑝
𝐺 = 𝐴𝐺 + 𝐻𝑝
𝐺) for the gross (pre-migration) average skill. Solutions for 𝑋𝑝, 𝑋𝑝
𝑀 
and 𝑋𝑝𝑁 (𝑋 = 𝐴, 𝐻, 𝑆) are: 
 
 
                                                     
7
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homogeneous one.  
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𝐴𝑝 = 𝐴
𝐺 −
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑝
𝑀 = 𝐴𝐺 +
𝜋𝜆
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑝𝑁 = 𝐴
𝐺, 
𝐻𝑝 = 𝐻
𝐺 −
𝜋𝜆2
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑝
𝑀 = 𝐻𝐺 +
𝜋𝜆2
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑝𝑁 = 𝐻
𝐺
, 
𝑆𝑝 = 𝑆
𝐺 − 
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆𝑝
𝑀 = 𝑆𝐺 +
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆𝑝𝑁 = 𝑆
𝐺
.  (7) 
As can be seen from (7), the brain drain is 𝜆 times the ability drain, the reason being that 𝑎𝑖 enters 
into ℎ𝑖 with coefficient 𝜆 (see equation 6). Since 𝜆 𝜖 (0, .5],
8
 it follows that the ability drain is larger 
than the brain drain. And from (6), 𝑉(ℎ𝑖𝑝) = 𝜆
2𝑉(𝑎𝑖), i.e., the variance of 𝑎𝑖 is greater than that of 
ℎ𝑖𝑝 (see also Table 1 below).  
Another result from (7) is that residents’ (migrants’) average ability, education and skill levels fall 
(rise) with inequality in the source country’s ability distribution, as measured by the variance of 𝑎𝑖. 
Thus, the host country benefits from greater inequality in ability as it raises the average skill level of 
its immigrants. And, as shown above, the policy itself also raises inequality in migrants’ source 
country. Finally, the variance of 𝑎𝑖 does not affect natives’ average ability, education or skill as its 
impact on residents’ and migrants’ values cancel each other out. Table 1 presents the impact of the 
points system on the ability drain and on the brain and skill drain and gain, relative to the closed 
economy case.  
What is the policy’s impact on ability, education and skill, relative to a closed economy policy 
(𝜋 = 0), i.e., ∆𝑋𝑝 ≡ 𝑋𝑝 − 𝑋0 (𝑋 = 𝐴, 𝐻, 𝑆)? Since there is no ability gain, average ability declines, 
with:  
 
∆𝐴𝑝 ≡ 𝐴𝑝 − 𝐴
𝐺 = −
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) < 0, ∆𝐻𝑝 ≡ 𝐻𝑝 − 𝐻0 = 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) −
𝜋𝜆2
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0, ∆𝑆𝑝 ≡
𝑆𝑝 − 𝑆0 = 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) −
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛0, ∆𝑆𝑝 < ∆𝐻𝑝.
9
     (8) 
 
 
Thus, the policy’s impact on ability (education and skill) is negative (ambiguous). Since ∆𝑆𝑝 =
∆𝐻𝑝  +  ∆𝐴𝑝 = ∆𝐻𝑝 −
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) < ∆𝐻𝑝, the policy’s impact on skill is more likely to be negative 
than that on education. Some studies (e.g., Beine et al. 2012) find that a net brain gain is more likely in 
larger source countries (∆𝐻𝑝 > 0), in which case ∆𝑆𝑝 < 0 < ∆𝐻𝑝 is a distinct possibility. They also 
find that most countries exhibit a net brain drain (∆𝐻𝑝 < 0), implying a larger net skill drain, i.e., 
∆𝑆𝑝 < ∆𝐻𝑝 < 0. On the other hand, the points system raises migrants’ ability, education and skill, 
with:  
 
∆𝐴𝑝
𝑀 ≡ 𝐴𝑝
𝑀 − 𝐴𝐺 =  
𝜋𝜆
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) > 0, ∆𝐻𝑝
𝑀 ≡ 𝐻𝑝
𝑀 − 𝐻0 = 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) +
𝜋𝜆2
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) > 0,  
 
∆𝑆𝑝
𝑀  ≡ 𝑆𝑝
𝑀
− 𝑆0 = 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) +
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) > 0.    (9) 
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 i) Under migration, 𝜆 > 0. Proof: 𝜆 = 0 implies 𝜋 = 0 and thus 𝑝𝑖 = 0;  and ii) 𝜆 ≤
1
2
: Proof: Residents’ actual (as 
opposed to expected) consumption under the vetting system (which is obtained from solutions in Section 4 below) is 
𝛼0 (𝑎𝑖 +
𝛼0
2
) − 2𝜆2(𝛼0 + 𝑎𝑖)
2 ≥ 0, and thus 𝜆2 ≤  𝜓 =
𝛼0(2𝑎𝑖+𝛼0)
4(𝑎𝑖+𝛼0)
2 . Since 
𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= −
𝛼0𝑎𝑖
2(𝑎𝑖+𝛼0)
3 ≤ 0 and 𝑎𝑖 ≥ 0, it follows 
that 𝜓 reaches a maximum at 𝑎𝑖 = 0 where 
𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= 0 and 𝜓 =
1
4
. Thus, 𝜓 ≤
1
4
 and 𝜆2 ≤ 𝜓 ≤
1
4
 or 𝜆 ≤
1
2 
, QED.  
9
 Equation (8) results from the fact that 𝐻0 = 𝛼0, 𝑆0 = 𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0 and 𝑆𝑝  = 𝐴
𝐺 + 𝐻𝑝
𝐺 −
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃 𝑉
(𝑎𝑖). 
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Results for source country’s natives as a whole (denoted by 𝑁) is:  
 
𝐻𝑝𝑁 − 𝐻0 = 𝑆𝑝𝑁 − 𝑆0 = 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴𝐺) > 0,  𝐴𝑝𝑁 − 𝐴0 = 0.     (10) 
Table 1: Points System– Source Country’s Ability, Education and Skill: Gain or Drain? a 
 Ability  
(1) 
Education  
(2) 
Skill  
(1 + 2) 
Ratio  
(1)/(2) 
Drain (i) −
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖)  −
𝜋𝜆2
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). −
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). 
1
𝜆
≥ 2. 
 
Gain (ii) -- 2𝜆(𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼0)  2𝜆(𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0)  -- 
 
Net Gain 
 (i) + (ii) 
 
−
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). 2𝜆(𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0) −  
𝜋𝜆2
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0. 
2𝜆(𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼0) −
 
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0. 
-- 
Variance 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) 𝜆
2 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) (1 + 𝜆
2) 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) 
1
𝜆2
≥ 4. 
a: Results are relative to the closed economy case. 
In other words, natives’ average education and skill levels are higher under the points system than 
under a closed economy, while their average ability is unchanged.
10
 
4. Vetting System 
I refer to an immigration policy that takes both ability and education into account as a “vetting 
system,” with variables designated by subscript ‘v’. One such system is the US H1-B visa program, 
where employers’ hiring decisions determine whether or not immigration takes place.11 Probability 𝑝𝑖𝑣 
and consumption under this policy 𝑐𝑖𝑣 are:  
 
𝑝𝑖𝑣 = 𝜋(𝑎𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑣) = 𝜋𝑠𝑖𝑣, 𝑐𝑖𝑣 = 𝑦𝑖𝑣 −
ℎ𝑖𝑣
2
2
= 𝛼0𝑠𝑖𝑣 + 𝜋(𝛼𝑑−𝛼0)𝑠𝑖𝑣
2 −
ℎ𝑖𝑣
2
2
≥ 0 , 𝜋 > 0.  
           (11) 
 
Maximizing 𝑐𝑖𝑣 with respect to ℎ𝑖𝑣, the solutions for ℎ𝑖𝑣, 𝑠𝑖𝑣, 𝑝𝑖𝑣, and ℎ𝑖𝑣 − ℎ𝑖𝑝 are: 
 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑣 =  
𝛼0
𝜙
+ 2𝜆𝑎𝑖, 𝑠𝑖𝑣 =
1
𝜙
(𝑎𝑖 + 𝛼0) = 
𝑠𝑖0
𝜙
, 𝑝
𝑖𝑣
=
𝜋
𝜙
(𝑎𝑖 + 𝛼0) = 
𝜋𝑠𝑖0
𝜙
,  
 
ℎ𝑖𝑣 − ℎ𝑖𝑝 = 𝑠𝑖𝑣 − 𝑠𝑖𝑝 = 𝜆(𝑎𝑖 − 𝐴
𝐺) ⋛ 0 ⇔ 𝑎𝑖 ⋛ 𝐴
𝐺 .     (12) 
                                                     
10
 In a non-selective policy, migration probability for all is 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃. Then, average education (skill) for both residents and 
migrants is 𝐻𝐺  (𝑆𝐺) and there is no ability or brain drain.  
11
 This assumes a well-functioning visa program, which is not necessarily the case. See Section 8 for more on this issue.  
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Thus, high- (low-) ability individuals attain a higher (lower) education level under the vetting than 
under the points system, resulting in greater education and skill inequality under the former. Also, 
since 
𝜕ℎ𝑖𝑣
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= 2𝜆, it follows that 
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑣0
𝜕𝑎𝑖
= (1 + 2𝜆)𝛼0. 
Since 
1
𝜙
= 1 + 2𝜆, we have 𝑠𝑖𝑣 = (1 + 2𝜆)𝑠𝑖𝑜 > 𝑠𝑖𝑜, and 𝑠𝑖𝑣 − 𝑠𝑖𝑜 = 2𝜆𝑠𝑖𝑜 > 0, i.e., the 
vetting system results in an increase in residents’ individual skill relative to the no-migration case. 
From (10), we have: 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑣) =
𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑜)
𝜙2
= (1 + 2𝜆)2𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑜) > 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑜) = 𝑉(𝑎𝑖). Since 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑝) =
(1 + 𝜆)2𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑜), it follows that 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑣) =
(1+2𝜆)2
(1+𝜆)2
𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑝) > 𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑝). The fact that 𝜆 𝜖 [0,
1
2
] implies that 
𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑣)
𝑉(𝑠𝑖𝑝)
 𝜖 [1,
16
9
]. Moreover, 𝑉(ℎ𝑖𝑣) = 4𝜆
2 = 4𝑉(ℎ𝑖𝑝). Thus, inequality of residents’ skill is greater 
under the vetting system than under the points system or the closed economy policy. Solutions for 𝐻𝑣
𝐺 
and 𝑃𝑣 are:    
 
𝐻𝑣
𝐺 =  
𝛼0
𝜙
+ 2𝜆𝐴𝐺 = 𝛼0 + 2𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) = 𝐻𝑝
𝐺 = 𝐻𝐺 , 𝑃𝑣 =
𝜋
𝜙
(𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺) =
𝜋𝑆0
𝜙
= 𝑃𝑝 = 𝑃.   
           (13) 
Solutions for residents, migrants and natives’ average ability, education and skill, are:  
 
𝐴𝑣 = 𝐴
𝐺 −
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐴𝐺 + 
𝜋
𝜙𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑣𝑁 = 𝐴
𝐺;  
    
𝐻𝑣 = 𝐻
𝐺 −
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐻𝐺 + 
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑣𝑁 = 𝐻
𝐺; 
 
𝑆𝑣 = 𝑆
𝐺 − 
𝜋
𝜙2(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆𝑣
𝑀 = 𝑆𝐺 +
𝜋
𝜙2𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆𝑣𝑁 = 𝑆
𝐺
,      
𝐴𝑣
𝑀 − 𝐴𝑣 =
𝜋
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
, 𝐻𝑣
𝑀 − 𝐻𝑣 =
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
, 𝑆𝑣
𝑀 − 𝑆𝑣 =
𝜋
𝜙2𝑃(1−𝑃)
,  (14)  
 
  
where 𝑆𝐺 = 𝐴𝐺 + 𝐻𝐺, and 
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
+
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
 =
𝜋(1+2𝜆)
𝜙(1−𝑃)
=
𝜋(1+2𝜆)2
1−𝑃
.  
The fact that 𝜆 ≤
1
2
 together with the results in (14) imply that the ability drain is larger than or equal 
to the brain drain, i.e., 
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ≥  
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). The results are summarized in Table 2. 
Though the points and vetting systems have the same qualitative impact relative to a closed 
economy policy, with residents (migrants’) average education, ability and skill levels falling (rising) 
with inequality in the ability distribution, migration’s impact under the vetting system is greater (in 
absolute value) than under the points system.  
The ability drain (in absolute value) under the vetting system, 
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) = 
𝜋(1+2𝜆)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), is greater 
than the ability drain, 
𝜋𝜆
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), under the points system. Similarly, the brain drain under the vetting 
system, 
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), is greater than the brain drain under the points system, 
𝜋𝜆2
1−𝑃
. Hence, the skill 
drain under the vetting system, 
𝜋(1+2𝜆)
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) =
𝜋(1+2𝜆)2
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), is greater than the skill drain under the 
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points system, 
𝜋(𝜆+𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). And migrants’ education, ability and skill gains are greater under the 
vetting than under the points system. 
Table 2: Vetting System – Non-migrants’ Ability, Brain and Skill: Net Gain or Drain? a 
 
 Ability 
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Skill 
(1 + 2) 
Ratio 
(1)/(2) 
Drain (i) −
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖).  −
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). −
𝜋
𝜙2(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). 
1
2𝜆
≥ 1. 
 
Gain (ii) -- 2𝜆(𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼0).  2𝜆(𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0).  -- 
 
Net Gain 
(i) + (ii) 
−
𝜋
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖). 2𝜆(𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼0) − 
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0. 2𝜆(𝐴
𝐺 + 𝛼0) −
 
𝜋
𝜙2(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) ⋛ 0. 
-- 
Variance 𝑉(𝑎𝑖) 4𝜆2𝑉(𝑎𝑖) (1 +  4𝜆
2
)𝑉(𝑎𝑖) 
1
4𝜆2
 ≥ 1 
 a: Results are relative to the closed economy case. 
Comparing average levels of education, ability, and skill, for residents, migrants and all natives, under 
the vetting and point systems: 
 
𝐻𝑣 = 𝐻𝑝  − 
𝜋(2𝜆 + 3𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐻𝑝
𝑀  +  
𝜋(2𝜆 + 3𝜆2)
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐻𝑣𝑁  =  𝐻𝑝𝑁 
 
𝐴𝑣 = 𝐴𝑝  −  
𝜋(1 + 𝜆)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐴𝑝
𝑀  +  
𝜋(1 + 𝜆)
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝐴𝑣𝑁  =  𝐴𝑝𝑁 , 
 
𝑆𝑣 = 𝑆𝑝  −  
𝜋(1 + 3𝜆 + 3𝜆2)
1−𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆𝑣
𝑀 = 𝑆𝑝
𝑀  +  
𝜋(1 + 3𝜆 + 3𝜆2)
𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), 𝑆𝑣𝑁  =  𝑆𝑝𝑁. (15) 
From (14), and from 𝐻0 = 𝛼0 and 𝑆0 = 𝛼0 + 𝐴
𝐺 (as shown in (4)), it follows that whether the vetting 
system results in a net brain and skill gain or drain is ambiguous, though net brain and skill drains are 
more likely under the vetting than under the points system, and the ability drain is greater under the 
former. Since 𝑃𝑝 = 𝑃𝑣 = 𝑃 by construction, it follows that natives as a whole have the same average 
ability, education and skill levels under the points and vetting systems.  
The host country benefits from greater inequality in the source country’s ability under both the 
points and the vetting systems as it raises migrants’ average skill level, with a greater benefit under the 
vetting than under the points system. Moreover, the two policies themselves raise inequality, with a 
greater increase under the vetting system.  
5. New Points System 
In order to attract immigrants with skills that better reflect labor market needs, various host countries, 
including Australia, New Zealand and Canada, moved to a new points system consisting of a 
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combination of the (old) points system and the vetting system. Assume the weights of the points and 
vetting systems in the new points system are 𝜔 and 1 − 𝜔, respectively, i.e., 𝑐𝑖𝑛 = 𝜔𝑐𝑖𝑝 + (1 − 𝜔)𝑐𝑖𝑣. 
Solutions can be shown to be equal to the weighted average (with weights 𝜔 and 1 − 𝜔) of the results 
under the points and vetting systems.  
6. Comparing Ability Drain and Brain Drain  
This section examines the relationship between the ability drain, 𝐴𝐷, and the brain drain, 𝐵𝐷. 
Educated immigrants typically enter the US under the H1-B visa program, i.e., they must obtain a 
position in a US firm or other organization, and must have a Bachelor’s Degree or more in order to 
qualify. These immigrants are likely to be thoroughly vetted, in terms of both their education and their 
ability, as employers obtain the benefits of judicious hiring decisions and bear the cost of hiring 
mistakes. Thus, a vetting system policy is assumed in the analysis. The main results for the 42 source 
countries as a whole are presented in Section 6.1 and for country groupings in Section 6.2. Derivation 
of the results is provided in the Appendix.  
6.1. Average for the 42 sample countries 
Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett (CMP, 2009) use data on 42 developing source countries to 
estimate the impact of migration on an individual’s income. They use several approaches to estimate a 
parameter, 𝜇, and capture the impact of selection on ability, 1 + 𝜇, on the ratio of an individual’s 
income in the US to that earned back home. They find that 𝜇 𝜖 (0, .5], which holds for 𝜆 as well (see 
footnote 8). Recall that ℎ𝑖𝑣 = 1 for 20 years of education. Given that 𝜇’s value obtained by CMP is for 
individuals with nine years of education (ℎ𝑖𝑣 = .45) and that the H1-B visa program requires at least a 
Bachelor’s degree or sixteen years of education (ℎ𝑖𝑣 = .8), the parameter 𝜇 is adjusted accordingly, 
and the ability drain and brain drain are obtained for the entire range of 𝜇 and 𝜆 values. An explanation 
of the derivation of the results is provided in the Appendix.  
The main findings are: i) the average value of 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 is 0.841 on average (see below for results on 
country groupings); ii) 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 > 1 in close to 60 percent of the cases; iii)) 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 increases with 
both 𝜆 and 𝜇. Note that these figures are likely to constitute a lower bound of the actual 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 ratios 
as many who enter the US under the H1-B program have more than a college degree.  
For instance, take the values for 𝜇 and 𝜆 of 0.1, 0.25 and 0.4, and 𝛼0 = 0.15. The corresponding 
values for 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 are presented in Table 3. First, changes in 𝜆 have a limited impact on 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷. As 𝜆 
increased from . 1 to . 4, 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 increases by .110 or close to 12 percent (bottom row). On the other 
hand, changes in 𝜇 have a large impact, with 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 increasing by .565 or close to 88 percent (last 
column) as 𝜇 increases from . 1 to . 4. The largest (smallest) increase occurs when 𝜇 (𝜆) rises from .1 
to .25. This is not surprising as the ratio 
𝜕(𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷)
𝜕𝜇
/
𝜕(𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷)
𝜕𝜆
 (on average over 𝛼0 values) is 17.1 for = 
𝜇 = .1, or double the 8.6 level for 𝜆 = 𝜇 = .25 (and 45 percent higher than the level for 𝜆 = 𝜇 = .4).12 
Second, 𝐴𝐷 > 𝐵𝐷 for six of the nine values shown, namely those for which 𝜇 equals . 25 or . 4. Third, 
on average for the nine values shown, the ability drain is 97.9 percent of the brain drain.  
  
                                                     
12
 The derivation of these results is available from the author upon request. The ratio of derivatives increases as 𝜆 = 
𝜇 decline. For instance, the ratio is 37 for 𝜆 = 𝜇 = 0.01. 
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Table 3: Ratio of Ability Drain to Brain Drain (𝑨𝑫/𝑩𝑫)  
 
  
 
0.1 
 
 
0.25 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
Average 
 
 
0.1 
 
.610 
 
.622 
 
.696 
 
.643 
 
0.25 
 
1.053 
 
1.062 
 
1.146 
 
1.087 
 
0.4 
 
1.152 
 
1.170 
 
1.301 
 
1.208 
 
Average 
 
.938 
 
.951 
 
1.048 
 
.979 
6.2. Comparing country groupings  
 
The results above are average values for the 42 source countries examined, and country results differ 
dramatically.
13
 For instance, migrants’ income (corrected for selection on observables) relative to that 
of source country residents varies from about 2 in the Dominican Republic and Morocco to around 15 
in Nigeria and Yemen. Each country can be classified into one of three categories, namely 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 >
(=)(<) 1. I find that 𝐴𝐷 > 𝐵𝐷 for 17 countries, 𝐴𝐷 < 𝐵𝐷 for 17 countries, and 𝐴𝐷 = 𝐵𝐷 for 7 
countries (where the latter comprises countries where . 95 ≤ 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 ≤ 1.05). Interestingly, the 
𝐴𝐷 < 𝐵𝐷 (𝐴𝐷 = 𝐵𝐷) (𝐴𝐷 > 𝐵𝐷) category is comprised of 11 (30) (47) percent of high-income 
developing countries, 65 (56) (42) percent of upper middle-income countries and 24 (14) (11) percent 
of lower middle-income countries. Thus, the 𝐴𝐷 > 𝐵𝐷 category has four times (two thirds) (half) the 
number of high (upper-middle) (lower-middle) income developing countries relative to the 𝐴𝐷 < 𝐵𝐷 
category (and it also includes 90 percent of the Latin American countries). These results suggest a 
positive relationship between source countries’ per capita income and the ratio 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷. This result 
also obtains from the model, as the ratio 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 = 1/2𝜆 (see Table 2) and 𝜆 falls with 𝛼0.  
Finally, irrespective of the level of the 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 ratio, it is important to keep in mind that:  
1. As is shown in equations (6) and (12), education is endogenous and determined by ability, and  
2. Ability’s heterogeneity is the ultimate cause of both the ability drain and the brain drain (since 
they are equal to zero under homogeneous ability).  
7. Policy implications  
Studies of the brain drain have found that a number of countries, particularly the larger ones, 
experience a net brain gain (e.g., Beine et al. 2008). As migrants are also positively selected for 
ability, migration results in an ability drain. So, countries might exhibit a net brain gain together with a 
                                                     
13
 The number of sample countries by region is: Sub-Sahara: 7, North Africa and the Middle East: 5, South Asia: 6, South-
East Asia: 5, South America: 10, Mexico: 1, and Other Latin America: 8.  
𝜆 
𝜇 
Ability Drain: Size, Impact, and Comparison with Brain Drain under Alternative Immigration Policies 
11 
net skill drain. The situation is obviously worse for countries experiencing a net brain drain – 
including most small poor island countries – as their average skill level falls due to both ability and 
brain drain.  
As shown in equation (15) in Section 4, the vetting system, such as the US H1-B visa program, 
generates a larger ability drain and a larger net brain drain (or a smaller net brain gain) than the points 
system, thereby raising the likelihood of a net skill drain. As mentioned in Section 5, several 
immigration countries, including Australia, New Zealand and Canada, have reformed their 
immigration policy from the old to a new points system that includes elements of the vetting system, 
thus raising the urgency for source countries of devising (market-friendly) ways to minimize the skill 
drain as well as collaborate with host countries in order to raise both countries’ migration benefits, as 
suggested below.  
Host countries concerned with source countries’ development could provide H1-B visas or other 
skilled immigrant visas whose extension or conversion to permanent status would require applicants to 
make some contribution to their home country, such as imparting their acquired knowledge to home 
country individuals – whether by working there for some period of time, regular visits, teaching via 
the internet, through some business relationship, or other. In addition to generating a direct benefit for 
migrants’ home country, such interaction would also raise bilateral trade (see Parsons and Winters’ 
(2014) excellent survey) and bilateral investment (Javorcik et al., 2009; Kugler and Rapoport, 2007) 
by reducing information and transactions costs, thereby benefiting both countries.  
Similarly, foreign students from developing countries often receive financial support from some 
public or private agency back home (e.g., government agency, private employer, university) or in the 
host country (e.g., university, foundation). Source and host countries should cooperate to ensure that 
foreign students who obtain their degree and apply for an immigrant visa spend some time in the 
source country (which is the case for foreign students who enter the US with a J-visa) or engage in 
some other form of interaction. Interaction with home country institutions – e.g., cooperation with 
research institutions and scientists – is likely to be beneficial for both countries. Moreover, as 
Spilimbergo (2009) has shown, foreign students who return from studies in democratic countries have 
a positive impact on democratic institutions in their home country, an outcome that might also arise in 
the case of increased interaction between foreign graduates and their home country.  
Agreements on expanding market access commitments for services provided by source countries to 
host countries, such as those delivered through the temporary cross-border movement of natural 
persons (also known as Mode IV, one of the four modes by which services are traded internationally), 
would benefit both sets of countries and would avoid some of the concerns related to the brain and 
ability drain associated with permanent migration. However, the North has so far restricted access to 
this mode of trading services. 
As for the host country, it might benefit from enforcing existing regulations associated with 
immigration. For instance, under the US H1-B visa program, skilled immigrants can be hired for 
positions for which no Americans are available. However, as has been widely reported, a few large 
outsourcing firms have ‘captured’ a large share of the available visas, enabling some large 
corporations to replace US professionals with younger and cheaper immigrants.
14
 These tend to be less 
experienced than those who would have been hired by smaller enterprises that are truly looking for 
someone with unique skills and are unable to do so. In other words, the quality of H1-B immigrants is 
likely to be lower and their skills are likely to be closer substitutes to (less complementary with) those 
                                                     
14
 A notable example is Southern California Edison, which replaced its IT employees with younger ones brought in through 
the H-1B program, with the original employees forced to train their replacements and sign nondisclosure agreements and 
gag orders. Salaries fell from $110,000 to $70,000 a year on average or by 36% (based on depositions in a Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearing spurred by complaints of the practice). 
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of natives than if the visa program worked properly. Avoiding such an impact requires stricter 
enforcement of the rules of the H1-B visa program.  
8. Conclusion  
A large number of studies have examined the impact of migration on education in source and host 
countries (including selectivity, brain drain and brain gain, and other related issues) but have not done 
so in the case of ability. This paper is an attempt to start filling this gap. The analysis shows that: 
 
i) The points and vetting systems generate an ability drain in source countries that is greater than the 
brain drain, with a smaller net change in average skill level than in average education level. Thus, 
countries that exhibit a net brain gain experience a net skill change that may be negative or, if 
positive, is smaller than the net brain gain. On the other hand, migrants experience an ability, brain 
and skill gain.  
ii) The impact of these policies (in absolute value) on migrants’ and non-migrants’ average ability, 
education and skill, increases with inequality (as measured by the variance in ability), and the 
policies themselves also raise the variance of ability, education and skill. These effects are larger 
under the vetting than under the points system, with the effects of the new points system being 
equal to a weighted average of the other two.  
iii) Data suggest that the ability drain is greater than the brain drain, with the difference between them 
increasing with source countries’ per capita income. 
 
 
The paper’s findings suggest that the ability drain is likely to be important and thus that policy 
research and policymaking should focus not only on education but on ability as well, recognizing that 
migration is likely to result in an ability drain and in a productivity loss that must be weighted against 
the productivity change associated with the net brain gain or net brain drain.  
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Appendix 
Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett (CMP; 2009) use data on 42 developing source countries 𝑗 and 
examine various income ratios (denoted here by lower-case letters), where the denominator is the 
average income of source country 𝑗’s residents, 𝑌0 = 𝛼0𝑆 = 𝛼0(𝐴 + 𝐻), where 𝐴 is unobservable 
ability and 𝐻 is observable education.15 CMP’ objective is to obtain the average income ratio, 
𝑦𝑑
′′ = 𝑌𝑑
′′/𝑌0, of migrants living in the US who acquired their education in their home country 𝑗, 
relative to the income of home country 𝑗’s residents with the same level of 𝐴 and 𝐻. Thus, 𝑌𝑑
′′/𝑌0 =
𝛼𝑑(𝐴 + 𝐻)/𝛼0(𝐴 + 𝐻) = 𝛼𝑑/𝛼0. The problem with such comparisons is of course that migrants’ 
self-select on both ability and education, whose levels are denoted by 𝐴𝑀 and 𝐻𝑀, respectively.  
CMP find that on average for the 42 source countries, migrants’ actual income ratio 𝑦𝑑 =
𝛼𝑑𝑆
𝑀/𝛼0𝑆 = 𝛼𝑑(𝐴
𝑀 + 𝐻𝑀)/𝛼0(𝐴 + 𝐻) = 5.89, i.e., migrants’ income is 5.89 times source country 
residents’ income. They first correct 𝑦𝑑 for migrants’ self-selection with respect to observables 𝐻 in 
order to obtain 𝑦𝑑
′ = 𝛼𝑑𝑆
𝑀′/𝛼0𝑆 = 𝛼𝑑(𝐴
𝑀 + 𝐻)/𝛼0(𝐴 + 𝐻) where, from equation (14), ∆𝐻 ≡ 𝐻
𝑀 −
𝐻 = 
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) and, from equation (1), 𝑦𝑑 − 𝑦𝑑
′ = 𝛼𝑑∆𝐻/𝑌0. They find that 𝑦𝑑
′ = 4.11 = .7𝑦𝑑. In 
other words, 𝛼𝑑∆𝐻/𝑌0 = .3𝑦𝑑. Thus, correcting for the impact of selection on observables reduces 
migrants’ income by 30 percent.  
Next, CMP correct for differences in migrants and non-migrants’ ability, replacing 𝑦𝑑
′ = 𝛼𝑑(A
M +
H)/𝑌0 by 𝑦𝑑
′′ = 𝛼𝑑(𝐴 + 𝐻)/𝑌0 = 𝛼𝑑/𝑆, where ∆𝐴 ≡ 𝐴
𝑀 − 𝐴 = 
𝜋
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖), and 𝑦𝑑
′ − 𝑦𝑑
′′ =
𝛼𝑑∆𝐴/𝑌0.  
Two conditions make it possible to assess the relative size of the ability drain, 𝐴𝐷, and the brain 
drain, 𝐵𝐷, from the relationship between 𝑌𝑑 − 𝑌𝑑
′ and  𝑌𝑑
′ − 𝑌𝑑
′′: i) the relationship between 𝐴𝐷 and 
𝐵𝐷 is identical to that between ∆𝐴 and ∆𝐻. From (14), ∆𝐴 ≡ 𝐴𝑀 − 𝐴 =
𝜋
𝜙𝑃(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) [=
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) +
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖)], where 𝐴𝐷 = 
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙(1−𝑃)
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) = 𝑃 ∗ ∆𝐴.
16
 Similarly, 𝐵𝐷 = 𝑃 ∗ ∆𝐻. Thus, 
/𝐵𝐷 = ∆𝐴/∆𝐻; and ii) ∆𝐴 and ∆𝐻 are multiplied by the same parameter, 𝛼𝑑, so that 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 can be 
obtained from the relative income differences.  
Parameter values are also subject to the restriction 𝑎𝑖 > 0, and 𝑦𝑑
′′ > 1 (as there is no incentive to 
migrate if 𝑦𝑑
′′ ≤ 1). Since 𝑦𝑑 = 5.89, correcting for selection on both observable education (as well as 
age and gender) and unobservable ability must be less than 4.89 of 5.89 or 83 percent of 5.89. 
Correction for difference in observables is 30 percent of 5.89, so that correction for difference in 
ability must be less than 53 percent or 1.767 times the correction for observables, i.e., 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 <
1.767.  
CMP estimate the ability drain’s impact on (1 + 𝜇) in 𝑦𝑑
′′ = 𝑦𝑑
′ /(1 + 𝜇) and find that 1 + 𝜇 𝜖 (1.0, 
1.5]. Recall that 0 < 𝜆 ≤ .5. Thus, both 𝜇 𝜖 (0,5] and 𝜆 𝜖 (0,5].  
Assume, for instance, that 𝜆 = .4 and 𝜇 = .3. From equation (12), we have ℎ𝑖 =  
𝛼0
𝜙
+ 2𝜆𝑎𝑖 . Recall 
that 
1
𝜙
= 1 + 2 𝜆. With 𝜆 = .4, 
1
𝜙
= 1.8 and 2𝜆 = .8. Thus, (12) becomes ℎ𝑖 =  1.8𝛼0 +. 8𝑎𝑖, or 𝑎𝑖 = 
1.25ℎ𝑖 −  2.25𝛼0. CMP compare migrants and non-migrants with nine years of education. Recalling 
that ℎ𝑖 = 1 represents 20 years of education, ℎ𝑖 for 9 years of education is equal to . 45, and thus 𝑎𝑖 = 
. 5625ℎ𝑖 −  2.25𝛼0. Migrants who enter the US via the H1-B visa program must have a Bachelor’s 
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 In fact, CMP account for education as well as age, gender and rural/urban location. 
16
 Note that migrants’ average ability ‘gain’ is 
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) = [(1 − 𝑃)/𝑃]*𝐴𝐷 and their average education ‘gain’ ∆𝐻
𝑀 is 
(𝐻𝐺 − 𝐻0) +
2𝜋𝜆
𝜙𝑃
𝑉(𝑎𝑖) = (𝐻
𝐺 − 𝐻0) + [(1 − 𝑃)/𝑃]*𝐵𝐷.  
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degree or a minimum of 16 years of education, i.e., ℎ𝑖 = .8 and 𝑎𝑖 = 1 − 2.25𝛼0. Thus, 1 + 𝜇 =
1.3 becomes 1 + 𝜇′ = 1 + 0.3 (
1− 2.25𝛼0
.5625− 2.25𝛼0
 ), i.e., 1 + 𝜇′ =
.8625−2.925𝛼0
.5625− 2.25𝛼0
. The restriction 𝑎𝑖 =
0.5625 − 2.25𝛼0 > 0 implies 𝛼0 < 0.25.  
The value of 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 is provided for several values of 𝛼0. Its derivation is explained for 𝛼0 =
.01. In that case, 1 + 𝜇′ =
.83325
.54
 and 𝑦𝑑
′′ =
1
1.54
𝑦𝑑
′ = .648𝑦𝑑
′ . The impact of ∆𝐻 is equal to . 3𝑦𝑑, i.e., 
𝑦𝑑
′ = 0.7𝑦𝑑, or 𝑦𝑑
′′ = .648 ∗ .7𝑦𝑑 = .454𝑦𝑑. Thus, the impact of selection on ability, ∆𝐴, is to reduce 
𝑦𝑑
′  by (1 − .648)𝑦𝑑
′ = .352𝑦𝑑
′ = .352 ∗ .7𝑦𝑑 = . 2462𝑦𝑑. Since the impact of ∆𝐻 is to reduce 
migrants’ income by . 3𝑦𝑑, we have ∆𝐴/∆𝐻 = .2462/.3 = .821 and, equivalently, 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 =
.821. At 𝛼0 = .05, 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 = .862. For 𝛼0 = .1, 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 =.946. At 𝛼0 = .15, 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 = 1.14, 
at 𝛼0 = .2, 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 = 1.32, at 𝛼0 = .22, 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 = 1.62, and at 𝛼0 = .23, 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 = 1.76. The 
ability drain is on average (over all 𝛼0-values) about 20 percent greater than the brain drain when 
𝜆 = .4 and 𝜇 = .3. The overall average value of 𝐴𝐷/𝐵𝐷 = 0.841. 
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